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Abstract
In this paper we investigate trade union formation. To this end we apply a model
with two types of labour where both groups decide on whether they prefer to be
represented by either two independent craft-specific (professional) labour unions or
by a joint (encompassing) labour union. Applying the asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution, we find that it is beneficial for at least one group of labourers to resist a
unification and to form instead its own independent labour union — and in some cases
even both groups are worse off under the umbrella of a joint union. Consequently, a
joint union must be considered as a rather unstable institution. As a mirror image,
profits are lower if the firm bargains with two independent craft unions. This explains
why employers vehemently oppose recent split offs of some occupational groups from
existing unions and from stipulated tariff unions.
Keywords: trade-union formation, wage-employment bargains, Nash bargaining so-
lution, encompassing and craft-specific labour unions, trade union merger
JEL classification: C78, J31, J41, J51
∗University Duisburg-Essen, Mercator School of Management, Lotharstraße 65, D–47057 Duis-
burg, Germany. email: Thorsten.Upmann@uni-duisburg-essen.de
†Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam & Tinbergen Institute, PO Box
1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. email: JMuller@ese.eur.nl
1. Introduction
Merger activity between labour unions1 has a long history in Western industrialised
countries and still continues to be a prevailing issue. Large numbers of mergers during
the 20th century are documented by, for example, Chaison (1980) for the US, Griffin
and Scarcebrook (1989) and Campling and Michelson (1997) for Australia, and by
Buchanan (1974, 1981) and Waddington (1992) for the UK. For some countries this
trend has even accelerated at the end of the century, which is shown, for example,
by Campling and Michelson (1997) for Australia. Similarly, a vivid merger process
of European trade unions at about the end of the last decade of the 20th century
is documented by Willman (1996) and Ebbinghaus (2003); and expositions of most
recent trade union mergers are given by Waddington (2006) for the EU, and by Moody
(2009) for the US.
The nature of the forces and the processes that lead to union mergers are varying
and depend on the particular institutional context.2 Yet, irrespective of the underly-
ing reasons and forces that led to, and the institutional framework that allowed for
the realisation of a particular merger, the concerned unions apparently spent a lot
of money and effort in order to materialize a merger: Manifold obstacles must be
surmounted and sometimes substantial opposition must be overcome before a new
labour union could come into existence. In view of this effort spent in order to create
large and presumably powerful (encompassing) labour unions, it is astonishing that
an opposite trend could be observed during the last few years: “Small” professional
unions (craft unions), which formerly had tariff unions together with larger industry
unions, fought for their right to negotiate independently with employers. Notable
separations occurred, for example, in Germany and South Korea, where since these
split-ups employers are faced with the presence of multiple trade unions within one
firm. While in Germany separations evolved without legislative changes,3 the frequent
establishment of multiple labour unions within Korean companies emanated from a
legislative change in 2011.4 Apparently, in these cases the separating employees do
1The notion union merger is used very broadly and includes both consolidations and transfers of
authority.
2Compare, for example, Morris (1986) and Campling and Michelson (1997).
3For example, in Germany the Vereinigung Cockpit (VC) which has become the recognised and
established representative of the pilots in wage negotiations. Subsequently the physicians’ association
Marburger Bund negotiated for the first time for a separate wage agreement in 2006. And most
recently, the engine drivers’ association GDL (Gewerkschaft Deutscher Lokomotivfu¨hrer) fought for
almost 12 month with the Deutsche Bahn for a separate wage agreement.
4Following an amendment to the Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, effective
as of July 1, 2011, the establishment of multiple labour unions within a company became allowed.
Subsequently, from July 1, 2011 to August 31, 2012, the Labor Relations Commission of Korea dealt
with more than 600 cases relating to the establishment of multiple labour unions.
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not feel well backed by the representatives of the large industry union, and believe
that they may negotiate for more than what they got in joint negotiations.
This raises the question which of the two strategies — building up joint, encom-
passing large labour unions, or the creation of small craft-specific unions consisting
of a homogeneous membership — is actually in the labourers’ (mutual) interest. Do
the respective employees benefit from joint negotiations with the employer(s), or may
some group of employees suffer from joint bargains relative to what they could have
obtained in autonomous bargains? The documented recent tendency towards sepa-
rate negotiations suggests that, at least, some groups of labourers have not benefited
from joint negotiations, or believe that they can negotiate for more on a stand-alone
basis. — In this paper we seek to shed some light onto this issue. To this end, we use
a microeconomic bargaining approach with two types of labourers.
Our approach ties in, of course, with former studies on the effects of potential
splits and mergers of trade unions. To our knowledge, Horn and Wolinsky (1988),
Davidson (1988), Jun (1989) and Dowrick (1989, 1993) were the first to analyse the
effects of co-operation between different trade unions on negotiated wages and em-
ployment. With the exception of Dowrick (1989), who makes use of co-operative
game theory, these authors follow a non-cooperative approach by applying Rubin-
stein’s alternating-offer game to model labour market negotiations and to investigate
the resulting effects of trade-union centralisation. While Horn and Wolinsky (1988)
and Dowrick (1993) elaborate the pattern of trade union formation for varying de-
grees of complementarity and substitutability between two types of labour,5 Davidson
(1988) and Dowrick (1989) assume that production requires one type of homogeneous
labour only. In other words, while Horn andWolinsky (1988) investigate the bargained
wage contracts for a single firm and thus labourers’ implied incentives to constitute
a firm-specific encompassing union (trade-union merger along professions), Davidson
(1988) and Dowrick (1989, 1993) investigate the labourers’ incentives to constitute
an industry union acting on behalf of the labourers of all firms (trade-union merger
along firms of the same industry).6 Explicitly taking into account a firm’s competitors
allows for both output market effects and alternative patterns of unionisation: the
possibility of vertical centralisation of trade unions (i. e., joint negotiations on behalf
of labourers of different firms). More recently, Gu¨rtzgen (2003) extends the analysis
5Jun (1989) assumes that the firm’s revenue depends only on the total employed labour (measured
in efficiency units), implying that the two types of labour are perfect substitutes in production (in
the sense that the isoquants are straight lines).
6Mergers between trade unions may take place either along firms (of the same industry) and in-
dustries or along professions. In the first case a merger implies a centralisation along the industry
dimension; in the second case, along the dimension of profession. In the literature, the first mode of
centralisations is frequently referred to as vertical centralisation; the second, as horizontal centrali-
sation (cf., for example, Gu¨rtzgen, 2003). Actual mergers frequently include both dimensions. For
example, German trade unions merged along both industries and professions.
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of Dowrick (1993) to multiple firms and various types of labour. This is done, how-
ever, for the special case of a Leontieff technology, where there is no substitutability
between different types of labour, thereby limiting the applicability of her results.
To summarize the findings of the literature: While trade union mergers along
different firms are profitable for the (organised) workforce under rather general condi-
tions, mergers along the professional dimension are so only if different types of labour
are complementary in production. Roughly, trade union mergers are profitable when-
ever higher wage claims on behalf of one group of labourers trigger positive spillover
effects on the demand for the other group. This condition is fulfilled when the two
types of labour are substitutes within a firm or (strategic) substitutes across firms.
In this way an encompassing union accomplishes to negotiate for higher wages when
compared with single unions. In short: Substitutability makes a strong case in favour
of joint negotiations.
The literature, though, basically takes the institutional framework as exogenously
given, and explores the consequences of alternative bargaining structures, that is, the
consequences of different degrees of (de)centralisation of labour market negotiations
for wages, employment, profits and labourers’ utility. However, more recently at-
tempts have been made to endogenise the degree of labour market (de)centralisation
or, more broadly, the formation of labour market institutions. Yang (1995) and most
notably Petrakis and Vlassis (2004) pursue a game theoretic approach to endogenise
this bargaining structure. With the labour market institutions emanating from the
equilibrium of a coalitional game, Petrakis and Vlassis succeed to explain the emer-
gence of alternative wage bargaining structures as a consequence of productivity asym-
metries among firms. In this paper, we also contribute to an endogenisation of the
bargaining structure: While Petrakis and Vlassis focus on vertical centralisation (cen-
tralisation along firms), we endogenise the bargaining structure along occupations or
crafts (horizontal centralisation).
Beyond the issue of the degree of centralisation, there is the question of the appro-
priate bargaining agenda, and thus of the equilibrium concept of the labour market.
Although each of the aforementioned contributions on trade union mergers focuses on
some other aspect of the issue, they have a common feature: All authors (with the
exception of Yang, 1995) consider equilibria on the labour demand curve. However,
apart from the competitive equilibrium, allocations on the labour demand curve are
not Pareto efficient. Thus, whilst the literature explores whether or not employees can
do better by adjusting the organisational structure of trade unions, they ignore the
possibility for Pareto improvements which may (simply) be realised by changing the
agenda of negotiations with employers, namely by extending the scope of negotiations
to wages and employment. Good arguments, positive and normative, can be made
in favour of efficient labour market contracts. From a positive point of view, labour
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unions seldom have the power to dictate wages (monopolistic union),7 and labour
unions and employers’ associations frequently do not bargain over wages alone (right-
to-manage approach), but negotiate for working conditions, working times, workforce,
manning rules, job guarantees etc. as well. In these cases where the union and the
firm bargain, either formally or implicitly, about both wages and employment, effi-
cient bargains are more descriptive than a model where the parties stop negotiating
short of an efficient outcome.8
Secondly, from a normative perspective, there is no reason why rational parties
should relinquish any potential of mutual gains. As Pareto efficiency requires that
bargaining covers all variables entering the parties utility functions, the union and the
employer (generically) benefit if they extend the scope of their negotiations to wages
and employment. Yet, once they discover that there is some scope for mutual benefits,
we should expect them to exhaust this potential; and if they won’t, we should advise
them to do so. In fact, even if there were evidence that the bulk of labour market
conflicts is settled on the labour demand curve, the normative argument still applies
— and thus calls for a thorough inspection of (axiomatic) solution concepts in the
context of labour market negotiations.
On grounds of these arguments, we complement the theoretical literature on
union mergers by using formal concepts of co-operative game theory to model efficient
solutions of the labour market conflict.9 In particular, we assume that the employ-
ers’ federation (or the firm) and the respective labour union bargain about both the
wage rate and the employment level, and eventually settle their conflict according to
7Horn and Wolinsky (1988), p. 485f, criticize those who (simply) assume that unions are setting
wages unilaterally rather than participating in some process of bargaining with the firm. We fully
agree with this critique.
8Given the variety of national and sectoral institutional differences, it is not surprising that the
empirical evidence for whether labour market equilibria lie on the labour demand curve or on the
Pareto curve (or somewhere in between) is mixed. From the perspective of a positive analysis, it
is important that there is some empirical evidence for equilibria on the Pareto curve — and this
is undoubtedly the case, as, for example, Brown and Ashenfelter (1986), Svejnar (1986), MaCurdy
and Pencavel (1986), Pencavel and Holmlund (1988), Bean and Turnbull (1988), Christofides (1990),
Skedinger (1992), Bughin (1993), Gavosto (1997) and Dimova (2006) demonstrate. A highly valuable
recent survey of this literature is provided by Lawson (2011), and the reader is referred to this work
for more details on the empirical evidence of various labour market models.
9Efficient Nash bargains have been established in labour market economics by McDonald and
Solow (1981), Creedy and McDonald (1991) and others, and have subsequently been applied by, for
example, Bayındır-Upmann and Raith (2003, 2005), Boeters (2004) and Gerber and Upmann (2006).
It has well been recognized that different solution concepts may bring about diverging comparative
static effects (compare, for example, Gerber and Upmann, 2006). It would thus not be surprising
if the consequence of union mergers were to vary with the solution concept applied as well. Yet, it
is beyond the scope of this paper to extend the analysis to a series of alternative solution concepts.
This issue must thus remain open for future research.
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the (asymmetric) Nash bargaining solution.10 Presuming this mode of settlement of
the labour market conflict, we scrutinize the conditions under which horizontal trade
union mergers may be favourable or unfavourable for the involved parties. This paper
thus illuminates the structural features under which horizontal mergers may be ex-
pected to occur or may be regarded as stable (with respect to group specific split offs).
In this sense we proceed along the lines of Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and Dowrick
(1993) who focuses on possible co-operation between different craft unions at the
firm (or industry) level. While these authors find that an encompassing labour union
tends to negotiate for lower wages (when compared with craft-specific unions), and
is thus likely to be split up, if both types of labourers are complements, we find that
this results comes about under more general assumptions — and is thus reinforced.
More precisely, we find that, if parties negotiate on wages and employment and are
thus capable of arriving at some (mutually) efficient outcome — captured here by
the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution — the decentralisation result found in the
literature can be generalised for some arbitrary concave production structures, and
does neither require complementarity between various types of labour nor linearity of
the production function.11 Rather a simultaneous determination of all four economic
variables, the wage rates and the employment levels of both groups, brings about the
instability of a joint labour union as a remarkably robust result.12 This result becomes
most pronounced when the (utilitarian) joint union completely substitutes the utility
of one group of labourers by the other, eventually achieving at a corner solution where
one group is merely paid the competitive wage while the other receives a substantial
mark-up.
Beyond the forces already explained, two additional “spillover effects” are dis-
covered which are responsible for strengthening the de-centralisation result: Firstly,
10Within a framework of meta bargaining van Damme (1986) and subsequently Trockel (2000,
2002), among others, provide strong arguments in favour of the Nash bargaining solution by demon-
strating its Nash implementability. Also, the literature provides a series of non-cooperative games
supporting co-operative solutions, that is, strategic games the equilibrium allocations of which
coincide with the respective co-operative solution; for the Nash bargaining solution, recent non-
cooperative foundations are provided, for example, by Miyagawa (2002); Laruelle and Valenciano
(2008); Miyakawa (2008); Kultti and Vartiainen (2010); Britz et al. (2010). (Since Binmore, 1987
the attempt to support or implement axiomatic solutions of co-operative games by Nash equilibria
of suitably specified non-cooperative games is referred to as the Nash Program.)
11More precisely, we do not assume either sign for the cross-derivative of the production function
with respect to both types of labour; we only presume that some minimal amount of each type of
labour is indispensable in production, but that, except for low employment levels, both types may
be either substitutes of complements.
12The aforementioned literature frequently imposes severe constraints on some of the variables
in order to reduce the dimension of the problem. For example, in Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and
Jun (1989) firms decide on employment before wage rates are negotiated. In addition, Jun assumes
that employees fix a wage differential before wage negotiations commence. We do not impose such
constraints on either wages or employment levels, but let parties freely negotiate them.
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the bargaining power of the amalgamated trade union is arguably some weighted av-
erage of the power of its constituting unions, which makes the stronger of the two
losing some of its vigour. Secondly, and more importantly, the joint labour union now
accounts for the negative effect that a higher wage demand on behalf of one group
increases the firm’s cost and thus reduces the scope for favourable deals on behalf of
the other group — an effect which is present irrespective of whether the two types of
labour are complements or substitutes in production. This negative spillover effect,
which may be interpreted as if the encompassing union is more management (or firm)
oriented than a craft union, makes the union moderate its wage demands. Finally,
within the framework of efficient bargains where parties negotiate over all relevant
variables, there is more scope for these forces to become effective. As a consequence,
within our framework of efficient bargains, the existence of craft-specific trade unions
is arguably more robust than previously suggested in the literature — and in this
way our analysis contributes to explaining the recently observed trend towards the
formation of smaller professional unions.
2. Outline
In order to focus on the pure effects of labour-market negotiations between labour
unions and an employers’ federation, we abstract from non-labour factors of produc-
tion and from any potential non-competitive behaviour on any but the labour market.
We therefore consider a competitive firm producing a homogeneous output, by means
of two types of labour, which for expository purpose we call high- and low-skilled
labour, but which should be considered as labels only. In general, the interests of each
group of workers may be represented by a corresponding group-specific, professional
labour union. In this case the employers’ federation (or the firm) has to negotiate
about wages and employment with each labour union separately but simultaneously.
As the alternative organisational scenario, we consider the case where both labourer
groups unite and form an encompassing union acting on behalf of both groups’ in-
terest. Naturally, we should expect a unification to emerge only if it is beneficial for
both groups; and similarly, we should expect a united labour union to break asunder
if it is in the interest of, at least, one group to constitute a separate, independent
labour union. We therefore contrast the outcome of the negotiations between the firm
and the two separate labour unions with the bargaining outcome when both labour
groups formed an encompassing union. In this way we are able to explore whether,
and if so under which conditions, either group prefers a joint or a craft-specific labour
union. Equivalently, this procedure highlights the incentives to either leave the joint
labour union and to form a professional labour union, or to unite the two independent
labour unions by constituting an encompassing trade union. To this end we commence
our analysis with the case where each group of workers is represented by a specific
professional labour union, and proceed with the analysis of a joint (or encompassing)
6
union. We then explore the stability of the two alternative organisational structures
by comparing the respective outcomes.13
We find that a merger of two independent labour unions gives at least one group
of labourers less than it would have achieved had it negotiated separately; and this
unfavourable effect may be dramatic: Although, we hold the institutional framework
fixed (the same solution concept is used before and after the merger), and we treat
the situation between the two groups basically symmetric, it may happen that the
bargaining outcome achieved under joint negotiations leaves one group of workers
with the competitive wage, a result which is clearly unsatisfactory for this group.
Effectively, since the joint labour union may trade the wage rate of one group for that
of the other, corner solutions may come about unless the hands of union’s executives
are tied to some form of symmetry in wage gains. Symmetry, though, is exactly the
condition under which it arguably happens that both types of labourers suffer from
establishing a joint union.
The driving forces behind this result are twofold. Firstly, since both groups of
labourers aim at a higher wage and employment level, their interests are parallel —
and in this sense rival: Each group aims at higher wages and a higher employment
level, which tends to jeopardize the achievement of the same target by the other
group though, as any successful bargain by one group leaves less room for the other
to manoeuvre for a higher wage bill. Since separate labour unions ignore these effects
imposed on the other group of labourers, their behaviour is more “aggressive” than
is the behaviour of an encompassing labour union.14 In negotiations with the em-
ployers, the latter can never credibly mimic the behaviour of two independent labour
unions by claiming to ignore the “external effects” imposed on the other group, for
their constitution demands for the maximisation of the aggregate utility of all of its
members.
Secondly, since a craft-specific labour union has a simple one-dimensional objec-
tive function, it simply negotiates for a high wage rate and high employment level
on behalf of its homogeneous membership. The bargaining outcome will thus obvi-
ously yield a wage share that exceeds its competitive level. The objective function
of an encompassing labour union, though, may be interpreted as a genuinely multi-
dimensional objective: an operationalised compromise between two objectives. As a
result, a joint labour union may trade a higher welfare of one group for a lower wel-
fare of the other. This process of substitution may eventually leave one group with
13Our model can be thought of as a two-stage game: In the first stage, both groups of labourers
decide on whether to constitute a joint union or two separate unions; in the second stage, both groups
either bargain with the firm jointly or separately corresponding to the constitutional decisions of the
first stage.
14This finding is fully in line with Horn and Wolinsky (1988), who also observe: when there are
two independent unions their behaviour is more aggressive, since each union disregards the agreement
reached by the other and bargains afresh for a share in the surplus.
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its reservation utility, the competitive outcome, while the other achieves at a very
favourable outcome. Consequently, if the interests of both groups are parallel and
the rationales for a merger thus coincide, a merger may turn out to be particularly
problematic, a finding which is also consistent with the empirical literature:
The data [. . . ] could possibly indicate that, where the unions planning to merge
share the same underlying motivations, the merger process is more likely to be
problematic than cases of merger where the rational is quite different for each
of the unions involved. (Campling and Michelson, 1997, p. 240.)
3. The Model
The group of workers of type i, (i = H,L), consists of a total mass of Ni labourer
households, all of which are assumed to have identical preferences.15 Each household
is either employed at the full regular working time or has no job at all. An employed
household of type i, receives a wage income equal to the (real) wage wi. Postulating
that a household’s income is commensurate with utility, wi coincides with the utility
level of type i from labour income. An unemployed household, though, attains some
fixed utility from the consumption of leisure and unemployment benefits, the sum of
which, expressed in terms of an income equivalent, amounts to w¯i ≥ 0, which can be
interpreted as the reservation wage below which no household of type i is willing to
work. This implies that labour supply of group i equals zero for all w < w¯i, equals
Ni for all w > w¯i, and is indeterminate, i. e., it is set-valued and equal to [0, Ni] for
w = w¯i.
The interests of all workers are represented by either two craft-specific labour
unions or by one joint labour union, depending on the mode of organisation of the work
force. We shall henceforth explore the consequences of both organisational structures,
and contrast them with each other. In any case, each labour union is assumed to act
on behalf on its members’ interest, maximizing the sum of its members’ utilities.
On the other side of the labour market there is a firm producing its output by
means of both types of labour. Assuming that all other factors of production are fixed,
these two types of labour are the only variable factors, so that output amounts to
Y = f(H,L), where H and L denote the employment levels of the respective type of
labour. We assume that the production function f is twice continuously differentiable,
with both types of labour possessing positive, fH , fL > 0, but decreasing marginal
products, fHH , fLL < 0. (Subindices of f denote partial derivatives.) Moreover, let
each type of labour be indispensable to sustain production, i. e., f(0, L) = f(H, 0) =
15For ease of presentation we will speak of NH (NL) labourer households in the following.
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0, ∀H,L,16 and assume that f(NH , NL) < NHw¯H+NLw¯L, that is, not all workers can
be employed at non-negative profits.
The interests of all firms are represented by an employers’ federation seeking
to maximize aggregate profits. Normalizing the price of the output good to unity,
aggregate profits equal
Π(wH , wL, H, L) := f(H,L)− wHH − wLL ,
where wH and wL denote the wages of the workers or type H and L, respectively.
Subsequently, we interpret profits as the income of some fixed factor of production,
say capital. Differentiating the employers’ objective function (profits) with respect
to wi and Li, i = H,L (with LH ≡ H and LL ≡ L), holding the level of Π constant
at, say, pi, reveals that their indifference curves (iso-profit curves) are increasing in Li
until fi = wi, and decreasing afterwards:
dwi
dLi
∣∣∣
Π=pi
=
fi − wi
Li
.
To interpret this, note that wi = fi(H,L), i = H,L, characterizes the (inverse)
labour-demand curve for type i–labour, given the employment level of the other type.
4. Bargaining with two independent labour unions
In case of separate bargains, where each group of labourers has formed its own union,
the labour union of type i labourer households, maximizes the aggregate utility of
these Ni households; or, in a framework of uncertainty, it maximizes the representative
members’ expected utility:
Ψi(wi, Li) := Liwi + (Ni − Li) w¯i , i = H,L
where Li denotes the mass of workers of type i who obtain a job.
17 Differentiation of
the union’s utility with respect to wi and Li, holding the level of Ψi constant at, say
ψi, shows that the union’s indifference curves are downward sloping whenever wi is
above the reservation wage w¯i:
dwi
dLi
∣∣∣
Ψi=ψi
= −
wi − w¯i
Li
< 0 .
Gerber and Upmann (2006) have shown that in such a setting the negotiations
between the firm/employers’ association and a labour union constitute a bargaining
16Think of pilots and flight attendants or air traffic controllers and mechanics, for example: If
either group is at strike, airplanes must stay on ground.
Note that our assumption f(0, L) = f(H, 0) = 0, ∀H,L together with f(H,L) > 0, ∀H,L > 0
implies fHL > 0 for a region sufficiently close to zero, (i. e., for low levels of employment both types
are complements in the usual sense), but does not require fHL > 0 over the whole domain, unless
we require f to be linearly homogeneous.
17In accordance with our previous terminology we will speak of Li as the number of employed
workers.
9
problem in the sense of formal bargaining theory. For this reason we omit a corre-
sponding proof and the translatation of our economic problem into the utility space,
but study the bargaining problem in the wage-employment space directly.
We assume that both the wage rate and the employment level are determined
by negotiations between the respective labour union and an employers’ federation
in an efficient way. That is, once an agreement is reached there is no room for re-
negotiations such that both parties can be made better off.18 In addition, we assume
that in the case of craft-specific labour unions, negotiations between each labour
union and the employers’ federation take place simultaneously. Accordingly the two
bargaining games are interdependent in the sense that the bargaining set of either
game depends on the outcome of the other game. Thus, while there is bargaining
and thus co-operative behaviour between each union and the firm, there is a kind of
competition between the two unions, as each of them, when bargaining with the firm,
takes the outcome of the negotiations of the rival union with the firm as given.19 Due to
this simultaneity of negotiations the equilibrium outcome of the two bargaining games
must satisfy a fixed point property: The solutions of the two games must be consistent
in the sense that they mutually define bargaining games such that when solved (by
application of the proposed solution concept), exactly these solutions materialise.20
Focusing on the (asymmetric) Nash bargaining solution, the outcome of the ne-
gotiations between the firm/employers’ association and the labour union of type i
labourers may be found as the point of intersection of the Nash curve with the Pareto
curve.21 Both curves can be derived as the solution of the following maximisation
problem:
max
wi,Li
[
Ψi(wi, Li)−Niw¯i
]µi[Π(wH , wL, H, L)]1−µi
=
[
Li
(
wi − w¯i
)]µi[f(H,L)− wHH − wLL]1−µi .
18Gerber and Upmann (2006) provide a couple of arguments in favour of efficient bargains. Al-
though arguments may be found why negotiations may stop short of an efficient outcome, for exam-
ple, imperfect information and uncertainty, we shall follow their arguments here and assume efficient
bargains.
19In a related, though more general framework Duggan (2001) uses the parallelity of co-operative
behaviour within groups and competition between groups to define an equilibrium concept to which
he refers as group Nash equilibrium.
20More formally, let B1 = (S1, d1) and B2 = (S2, d2) denote two bargaining games, and let
xi = φ(Bi) be a solution of Bi. Since the bargaining games are interdependent we have B1(x2) =
(S1(x2), d1(x2)) and B2(x1) = (S2(x1), d2(x1)). Then, an equilibrium requires x1 = φ(B1(x2)) and
x2 = φ(B2(x1)), or more compactly in vectorial notation x = ψ(x) with ψ := φ ◦B.
21When both groups of labourers are represented by independent labour unions, an internalisation
(on the side of workers) fails to materialise, and in this sense Pareto efficiency of a bargaining outcome
should be understood as internal (or bilateral) Pareto efficiency.
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where µi ∈ [0, 1] and 1 − µi represent the bargaining power of the labour union of
group i, i = H,L, and the employers’ federation, respectively.22 In this formulation,
we assumed that the disagreement (dispute or break-off) point equals the utility pair
(Niw¯i, 0). This is consistent with our assumption f(0, L) = f(H, 0) = 0, ∀H,L (see
p. 9, and in particular fn. 16), if we allow for strikes and lockouts. For if one group
is at strike, and production thus breaks down, firms may at not cost suspend workers
not being on strike, and need thus not pay their wages.23
For either of both bargaining problems, the associated maximisation problem
yields two first-order conditions: the Pareto curve and the Nash curve. The former
is defined as the set of all employment-wage combinations such that both parties’
indifference curves are tangent to each other, while the latter determines the bargained
wage as the weighted average of the marginal and average productivity of labour, net
of the cost of other factors. Defining the elasticity of excess utility of group i (i = H,L)
from a given wage rate by σi(w) := w/(w − w¯i), we may write the Pareto curves as
σH(wH) =
wH
wH − fH(H,L)
, (1)
σL(wL) =
wL
wL − fL(H,L)
, (2)
while the Nash curves read as24
wH = µH
f(H,L)− wLL
H
+ (1− µH)fH(H,L) , (3)
wL = µL
f(H,L)− wHH
L
+ (1− µL)fL(H,L) . (4)
Taken together, equations (1) to (4) yield a system of four equations, the solution
of which gives the negotiated wages wˆH and wˆL and the negotiated employment
levels Hˆ and Lˆ — and correspondingly the equilibrium payoffs of the three par-
ties: ΨH(wˆH , Hˆ), ΨL(wˆL, Lˆ), Π(wˆH , wˆL, Hˆ, Lˆ). Apparently, equations (1) and (2)
boil down to w¯H = fH(Hˆ, Lˆ) and w¯L = fL(Hˆ, Lˆ), respectively, implying that both
types of labour are employed at the level where its marginal product equals its social
cost — and thus both types of labour are employed at their socially efficient, that
is, at their competitive levels (subsequently denoted by superscript c): Hˆ = Hc and
Lˆ = Lc, and therefore Yˆ = Y c := f(Hc, Lc).
22As thoroughly explained by Binmore et al. (1986) the “bargaining power” of a party should
reflect either asymmetries in the bargaining procedure (within a time preference model) or in the
parties’ beliefs (within a risk of breakdown model).
23If lockouts are not possible, firms profits may become negative during dispute; if, on the other
hand, striking workers may be partially substituted by other workers, profits during dispute may
become positive. There is, thus, some unavoidable degree of arbitrariness with respect to the dis-
agreement payoffs.
24It is straightforward to verify that the Pareto curve is vertical and the Nash curve is decreasing
in the (H,wH)–space, respectively in the (L,wL)–space.
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It therefore remains to determine the equilibrium wage rates. In view of eq. (3)
respectively (4) we see that a higher (relative) bargaining power of the labour union
of group i brings about both a higher wage rate (at a constant employment level). In
the limiting cases we find that for µi → 0, the wage rate converges to the competitive
wage, i. e., wˆi = w
c
i = w¯i = fi(H
c, Lc), while for µi → 1 workers acquire the total
surplus and firms are thus left with zero profits: wˆi = (Yˆ − wˆ−iLˆ−i)/Lˆi, implying
Π(wˆH , wˆL, Hˆ, Lˆ) = Yˆ − wˆHHˆ − wˆLLˆ = 0. For this reason, at most one union may
exert monopoly power, and we thus henceforth assume µHµL < 1.
In order to arrive at a closer look at the negotiated wage rates, it is helpful to
solve eqs (3) and (4), evaluated at wˆH , wˆL, Hˆ, Lˆ, for both wage rates, yielding
wˆH = ηˆH
Yˆ − fLLˆ
Hˆ
+ (1− ηˆH)fH , (5)
wˆL = ηˆL
Yˆ − fHHˆ
Lˆ
+ (1− ηˆL)fL , (6)
where
ηˆH :=
µH(1− µL)
1− µHµL
and ηˆL :=
µL(1− µH)
1− µHµL
,
with ηˆH , ηˆH ∈ [0, 1] and µHµL < 1. Apparently, the negotiated wage rate of group i
is a weighted average of its marginal product, fi, and the profit per worker (before
labour cost) if the other factor were paid its marginal product, (Yˆ −f−iLˆ−i)/Lˆi. This
shows that workers of group i bargain with the firm over the total available surplus
(or economic rent), which equals the value of production net of social cost of labour.
Alternatively, using wcH = w¯H = fH(Hˆ, Lˆ) and w
c
L = w¯L = fL(Hˆ, Lˆ) together with
Hˆ = Hc and Lˆ = Lc and collecting terms, wage equations (5) and (6) may equivalently
be expressed as
wˆH = ηˆH
pic
Hˆ
+ w¯H and wˆL = ηˆL
pic
Lˆ
+ w¯L ,
where pic := Π(wcH , w
c
L, H
c, Lc) = f(Hc, Lc)−wcHH
c−wcLL
c denotes the profit achieved
in a competitive labour market. Apparently, the wage rates bring about a mark-up
on the respective reservation wage. Since the reservation wage coincides with the
competitive wage rate, each employed worker is better off under union-firm bargains,
when compared with the competitive outcome. Since the negotiated employment level
equals the competitive level, Hˆ = Hc and Lˆ = Lc, the wage share25 of group i, given
by ωˆi := wˆiLˆi/Yˆ , exceeds the competitive wage share, defined as ωˆ
c
i :=
Lˆifi
Yˆ
. This
can be seen very clearly by multiplying the wage equations by Lˆi/Yˆ and rearranging
terms, arriving at
ωˆH = ωˆ
c
H + ηˆH ωˆ
c
K , (7)
ωˆL = ωˆ
c
L + ηˆLωˆ
c
K , (8)
25The wage share is generally defined as ωi := wiLi/Y .
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where ωˆcK :=
Yˆ−LˆfL−HˆfH
Yˆ
, denotes the income share of the fixed factor if all factors
were paid their marginal products, to which we refer henceforth as competitive profit
share. Consequently the profit share (or the share that accrues to the fixed factor,
i. e., capital), defined as ωˆK := 1− ωˆH − ωˆL then amounts to
26
ωˆK =
(1− µH)(1− µL)
1− µHµL
ωˆcK = (1− ηˆH − ηˆL)ωˆ
c
K . (9)
The negotiated wage share of group i, ωˆi, thus equals the competitive wage share ωˆ
c
i
plus some fraction ηˆi of the share of the competitive profit share. We thus see that
the parties bargain over the distribution of the potential profit defined by competitive
markets factor income. Since either group of labourers accomplishes to acquire a
share that exceeds the respective competitive level, the profit share ωˆK necessarily
falls short of its competitive level, i. e., ωˆK ≤ ωˆ
c
K . Moreover, as equation (9) reveals,
the profit share ωˆK is decreasing in the bargaining power of either group of labourers,
µH and µL. Accordingly, if the bargaining power of either labour union converges to
unity, the respective union accomplishes to reap the full disposable profit, leaving firm
owners and the other union with zero income (in excess of their reservation levels).27
In contrast, when the bargaining power of a labour union converges to zero, it fails
to acquire any benefit in excess of the competitive level.
This result can also be illustrated by inspecting the ratio of the gains which
the two types of labourers acquire from negotiations, more precisely, the ratio of
excess wage payments received by both groups, generally defined as R := L(wL−w¯L)
H(wH−w¯H)
.
Subsequently, let Rˆ := Lˆ(wˆL−w¯L)
Hˆ(wˆH−w¯H )
denote the ratio of excess wage payments under
separate bargains. Although, Rˆ is by definition an endogenous variable, as it depends
on the bargaining outcome (wˆH , wˆL, Hˆ, Lˆ), it in fact turns out to be a constant,
depending on the parameters µH and µL only.
Lemma 1. Under separate bargains, the ratio of excess excess wage payments is a
constant, amounting to
Rˆ =
ηˆL
ηˆH
=
(1− µH)µL
(1− µL)µH
.
Proof: Expanding Rˆ and expressing the numerator and the denominator in terms
of wage shares yields Rˆ = (ωˆL − ωˆ
c
L)/(ωˆH − ω
c
H). Substituting from eqs (7) and (8)
provides the first equality; and then using the definitions of ηˆH and ηˆL, the second. 
26Note that (1−µH)(1−µL)1−µHµL ∈ [0, 1].
27In the four polar cases where either of both labour unions has either no or full bargaining power,
we obtain
ηˆH |µH=0 = 0, ηˆL|µH=0 = µL, ⇒ ηˆK |µH=0 = 1− µL,
ηˆH |µH=1 = 1, ηˆL|µH=1 = 0, ⇒ ηˆK |µH=1 = 0.
and correspondingly if µL equals either 0 or 1.
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According to Lemma 1 the ratio of wage payments received by both parties, in
excess of their respective reservation wages, is uniquely determined by the parameters
of bargaining power of the two labour unions. This ratio is positively affected by µL
and negatively by µH , implying that the higher the bargaining power of each craft-
union, the higher total net wage payments received by the respective group relative
to those of the other. (Note that for the symmetric case we have µH = µL ⇔ Rˆ = 1.)
Moreover, observe that, by definition, R also coincides with the ratio of excess wage
shares. (We have already made use of this in the proof of Lemma 1.) Consequently,
not only does a higher bargaining power of group i increase its wage share ωˆi and
thus its gain over the competitive wage share ωˆi − ωˆ
c
i , but also does group i achieve
more in relative terms.
5. Bargains with a united labour union
We now consider the alternative organisational structure of the labour force where
both groups of labourers have formed a joint labour union which acts on behalf of
all labourers’ interests. In accordance with our previous specification of the objective
functions of the two separate unions, we assume that the utility of this joint union is
the sum of the utilities of its constituents:28
Ψ(wH , wL, H, L) := H wH + (NH −H) w¯H + LwL + (NL − L) w¯L .
In negotiations with the employers’ federation, the parties bargain about wH , wL,
H and L simultaneously. The bargaining outcome is thus obtained as the solution of
the maximisation problem:
max
wH ,wL,H,L
[
Ψ(wH, wL, H, L)−NHw¯H −NLw¯L
]µ[
Π(w,L)
]1−µ
=
[
H
(
wH−w¯H
)
+L
(
wL−w¯L
)]µ[
f(H,L)−wHH−wLL
]1−µ
,
where µ is some weighted average of the bargaining power of both groups of labour-
ers.29 More precisely, µ is a short hand notation for some function µ : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→
[0, 1] which is weakly increasing in both arguments, with µ(µH, µL) ∈ [min{µH , µL},
max{µH, µL}], ∀µH , µL ∈ [0, 1].
28This assumption is also standard in the literature, compare, for example, Davidson (1988) and
Dowrick (1989, 1993).
29The bargaining power of the joint labour union may, for example, be equal to the arithmetic,
the harmonic or the geometric mean of µH and µL, but it may also be equal to either min{µH , µL}
or max{µH , µL}. The way µ is composed of µH and µL should reflect the actual mode of the
unification of the two labour unions. However, the reasons and the procedure of such a unification
are multifarious, and equally broad may be the resulting range of the bargaining power of a unified
labour union. Accordingly, a theory of trade union formation tailored to the particular circumstances
of the unification under consideration, is necessary to explain, and thus to endogenise, the resulting
value of µ. — But such an endogenisation, though desirable, is beyond the scope of this paper.
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The first-order conditions of this maximisation problem are given by
σH(w
∗
H) =
w∗H
w∗H − fH(H
∗, L∗)
, (10)
σL(w
∗
L) =
w∗L
w∗L − fL(H
∗, L∗)
, (11)
w∗H = µ
∗
H
f(H∗, L∗)− w∗LL
∗
H∗
+ (1− µ∗H)fH(H
∗, L∗) , (12)
w∗L = µ
∗
L
f(H∗, L∗)− w∗HH
∗
L∗
+ (1− µ∗L)fL(H
∗, L∗) , (13)
where
µ∗H :=
µ
1 + (1−µ)R∗
, µ∗L :=
µ
1 + (1−µ)R∗−1
, and R∗ :=
L∗(w∗L−w¯L)
H∗(w∗H−w¯H)
.
Again, the bargaining agreement is determined by the intersection of the respec-
tive Nash curve with the respective Pareto curve. Moreover, carefully observe that
conditions (10)–(13) coincide with the corresponding conditions (1)–(4) for separate
negotiations, except that in eqs (12) and (13) µH and µL have been replaced by µ
∗
H
and µ∗L, respectively — we subsequently refer to the latter as notional bargaining
power. The replacement of µH and µL by µ
∗
H and µ
∗
L, respectively, seems to be a
subtle difference, but as we shall see this turns out to be crucial and represents the
driving force behind our results.
Let us first investigate conditions (10) and (11). From these it follows that
w¯H = fH(H
∗, L∗) =: f ∗H and w¯L = fL(H
∗, L∗) =: f ∗L. Recalling that we also found
in the case of independent labour unions w¯H = fH(Hˆ, Lˆ) and w¯L = fL(Hˆ, Lˆ), we
conclude Hˆ = H∗ = Hc and Lˆ = L∗ = Lc, and therefore Yˆ := f(Hˆ, Lˆ) = Y c :=
f(Hc, Lc) = Y ∗ := f(H∗, L∗). So, as a first central result we obtain that both
institutional scenarios lead to the same employment levels, which coincide with the
respective competitive levels.
Proposition 1. Separate and joint negotiations both lead to the same employment
levels, which in turn coincide with the competitive levels:
Hˆ = H∗ = Hc, Lˆ = L∗ = Lc,
and thus Yˆ = Y ∗ = Y c.
Since employment and thus production levels are fixed and equal to their competitive
levels under both bargaining regimes, the marginal products of labour must be so as
well. Consequently the competitive wages shares, ω∗ci := (L
∗
i f
∗
i )/Y
∗ (i = H,L), and
the competitive profit share, ω∗cK := (Y
∗ − L∗f ∗L − H
∗f ∗H)/Y
∗ under joint negotia-
tions, coincide with the respective shares under negotiations with independent labour
unions, ωˆci and ωˆ
c
K , for these shares do not depend on actual wages.
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Corollary 1. Separate and joint negotiation both lead to the same competitive wage
shares, i. e., ωˆcH = ω
∗c
H and ωˆ
c
L = ω
∗c
L , and to the same competitive profit share, i. e.,
ωˆcK = ω
∗c
K .
According to Corollary 1, we may subsequently drop the scenario-specific symbols
and safely write (whenever appropriate) ωci := ω
∗c
i ≡ ωˆ
c
i , for i = H,L,K for the
competitive wage and profit shares.
A direct consequence of Proposition 1 is that any difference in bargaining outcome
of the two scenarios must originate from discrepancies in wage rates. So we shall next
explore eqs (12) and (13) determining the wage rates for a joint labour union. To this
end, it is instructive to solve these equations for the negotiated wage rates, yielding
w∗H = η
∗
H
Y ∗ − f ∗LL
∗
H∗
+ (1− η∗H)f
∗
H , (14)
w∗L = η
∗
L
Y ∗ − f ∗HH
∗
L∗
+ (1− η∗L)f
∗
L , (15)
where
η∗H :=
µ∗H(1− µ
∗
L)
1− µ∗Hµ
∗
L
=
µ
1 +R∗
and η∗L :=
µ∗L(1− µ
∗
H)
1− µ∗Hµ
∗
L
=
µ
1 +R∗−1
.
(The latter equalities result from substituting the definitions of µ∗H and µ
∗
L.) Similar
to negotiations with separate labour unions, the negotiated wage rate of group i
is a weighted average of its marginal product, f ∗i , and the profit per worker if the
other factor were paid its marginal product, (Y ∗− f ∗
−iL
∗
−i)/L
∗
i . However, the weights
attached to the two components differ, as ηˆi is replaced by η
∗
i under joint bargains.
Irrespective of whether we consider the implicit representation, given by eqs (12)
and (13), or the explicit representation of the wage rates, given by eqs (14) and (15),
we readily find that the (relative) weights attributed to the marginal and the average
products of labour are modified, when compared with the weights under separate bar-
gains. This modification consists of two components: Firstly, the (relative) bargaining
power of the joint labour union is some weighted average of those of the two single
unions, µH and µL, which are now replaced by the bargaining power of the joint labour
union µ. This implies, ceteris paribus, that the post-unification bargaining power is
(weakly) lower for the labour union with the higher pre-unification bargaining power,
and (weakly) higher for the other one. Secondly, the fact that the joint labour union
takes into account the utilities of both groups of employees results in the appearance
of the additional terms (1− µ)R∗ and (1− µ)R∗−1 in the denominator of µ∗H and µ
∗
L,
respectively.30 Because these terms are both non-negative, we infer
µ ≥ µ∗H and µ ≥ µ
∗
L. [and also µ ≥ η
∗
H , µ ≥ η
∗
L].
30Note that since R∗ depends on the equilibrium values of H,L,wH and wL, the notional bargain-
ing powers µ∗H and µ
∗
L are endogenous as well. This dependence can best be seen by considering the
equivalence µ∗H > µ
∗
L ⇔ R
∗ < 1 ⇔ H∗(w∗H−w¯H) > L
∗(w∗L−w¯L). Thus, the notional bargaining
power of the H-type labourers exceeds that of the L-type labourers if, and only if, the former groups
attain a higher net utility than the latter.
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The notional bargaining power of each union can thus not be larger than the actual
bargaining power of the joint labour union — and they are strictly smaller if R∗ ∈
(0,+∞). In other words, the notional bargaining power of the joint union is for each
group of workers lower than the average bargaining power of the two autonomous
labour unions, µ.
Intuitively, R∗ accounts for the wage (and employment) effects which a labour
contract on behalf of one type of labour exerts on the other.31 While a craft-specific
labour union ignores these “externalities”, an encompassing labour union acknowl-
edges for these effects. Consequently, a joint labour union uses, the variables wi (and
Li) to affect the welfare of both types of workers, — and may thus trade L-type work-
ers’ welfare for H-type workers’ welfare (and vice versa), as both are substitutes in its
objective function. This “internalisation” is reflected in R∗ and is thus a component
of the parameters of notional bargaining power, µ∗H and µ
∗
L.
Equivalently expressing the bargaining outcome in terms of the wage shares we
obtain
ω∗H = ω
∗c
H + η
∗
Hω
∗c
K , (16)
ω∗L = ω
∗c
L + η
∗
Lω
∗c
K , (17)
from which we infer that the profit share, ω∗K := 1− ω
∗
H − ω
∗
L, equals
ω∗K = (1− µ)ω
∗c
K . (18)
As in the case of independent labour unions, the negotiated wage share equals the
competitive wage share ω∗ci plus some fraction η
∗
i of the share of the fixed factor, when
all factors were paid their marginal products ω∗cK . Since η
∗
i is increasing in µ, both the
wage rate and the wage share (of group i) are, ceteris paribus, increasing in bargaining
power of the joint union — while the profit share is decreasing in µ.
Under joint bargains the ratio of excess (or net-) wage payments, R∗, is deter-
mined by the ratio of notional bargaining power of the two groups of labourers.
Lemma 2. Under joint bargains, the ratio of excess wage payments amounts to
R∗ =
η∗L
η∗H
=
(1− µ∗H)µ
∗
L
(1− µ∗L)µ
∗
H
.
Proof: Expanding R∗ and expressing the numerator and the denominator in terms
of wage rates yields R∗ = (ω∗L−ω
∗c
L )/(ω
∗
H −ω
∗c
H ). Substituting from eqs (16) and (17)
provides the first equality; and then using the definitions of η∗H and η
∗
L, the second. 
31As Proposition 1 shows the employment effect disappears under the present specification.
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6. Who benefits from a joint labour union?
It is now natural to ask whether separate bargains are in the interest of either group
of workers, or joint negotiations are favourable for both groups. This leads us to the
question whether two separate unions or a joint union will materialise. Treating each
union as a player with utility functions UL = ΨL and UH = ΨH as defined above,
we may look at the problem of constituting a joint union from two alternative game
theoretic perspectives: From a non-cooperative perspective we may view this problem
of a normal form game with two players, N = {L,H}, where each player (union) i ∈ N
selects a strategy si from the set S = {a, j}, with elements interpreted as choosing
“stay alone” (a) or “constitute joint union” (j). A joint union is established if, and
only if, both players choose to play j, otherwise two independent labour unions are
established, and the resulting payoffs are given by
(UL, UH)(sL, sH) =
{
(Ψ∗L,Ψ
∗
H) if (sL, sH) = (j, j),
(ΨˆL, ΨˆH) else,
with Ψˆi and Ψ
∗
i as given in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. To solve this game, the
applied equilibrium concept is that of a Nash equilibrium. — Alternatively, from the
perspective of co-operative game theory we may view this problem as a coalitional
game with non-transferable utility. With N = {L,H}, there is only one coalition,
the grand coalition N , along with the singletons {L} and {H}, with resulting sets of
payoff allocations V (N) = compH({Ψ∗L,Ψ
∗
H}) and V ({i}) = compH({Ψˆi}), ∀i ∈ N .
(For some set X , compH(X) denotes its comprehensive hull.)32 To solve this game, we
apply the concept of the core.33 Clearly, in our case the two approaches are equivalent
in the sense that the formation of a joint union is in the core of the coalitional game
if, and only if, a joint union is formed in the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative
game. For this reason, we only need to check whether both groups of labourers benefit
from a joint union or either of both may be better off by staying alone — and may
leave the specific interpretation of game-theoretic foundation to the reader.
For a given group of labourers, an independent labour union is more favourable
than the constitution of a joint labour union, if their aggregated utility is higher under
separate negotiations when compared with joint negotiations. A nice consequence of
32In our framework, as in many other real world applications, the payoff allocations available to
a coalition depend on the actions taken by other players. (For a thorough discussion of this issue
see Ray, 2007.) To deal with this issue, we assume that subsequent to the coalitional game, the
resulting bargaining games are solved according to the specified solution concept. In this sense,
non-cooperative behaviour enters into the sequential (two stage) game, where unions first decide
whether to constitute a joint union or to stay separate and then negotiate with the firm; and the
applied solution concept of this game is subgame-perfectness.
33That is, the allocation x is in the core if, and only if, it is feasible for the grand coalition,
i. e.x ∈ V (N), and no other coalition, which here means no single player, has a feasible vector which
is strictly better for all of its members.
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the fixed employment levels (see Proposition 1) is that this comparison can conve-
niently be executed in terms of the resulting wage shares. Making use of Corollary 1,
a direct comparison of eqs (7)–(9) with eqs (16)–(18) is readily accessible, as the wage
shares and the profit share under separate and joint negotiations reduce to
ωˆH = ω
c
H + ηˆHω
c
K , ωˆL = ω
c
L + ηˆLω
c
K , ωˆK = (1− ηˆH − ηˆL)ω
c
K ,
ω∗H = ω
c
H + η
∗
Hω
c
K , ω
∗
L = ω
c
L + η
∗
Lω
c
K , ω
∗
K = (1− µ)ω
c
K .
The wage rate and thus the wage share formulae under separate and joint bargains
differ only in the values of the “effective bargaining power”: ηˆi vis-a`-vis η
∗
i , (i =
H,L). Note that in both scenarios the sum of the wage shares of both groups of
labourers is constant, as ωˆH + ωˆL = 1 − ((1 − µH)(1 − µL)/(1 − µHµL))ω
c
K and
ω∗H + ω
∗
L = 1 − (1 − µ)ω
c
K . Apparently, the joint labour union bargains with the
employers’ federation over the pure economic rent (profit), pic, or, equivalently, over
the competitive profit share ωcK := pi
c/Y c. The higher the relative bargaining strength
of the (joint) labour union the more labourers succeed to acquire a larger share of the
pure economic rent.
Next we shall derive the central result of the paper: that at least one group of
labourers benefits from leaving the joint union (if it is already in existence) and from
constituting its own craft-specific labour union; or from a pre-unification point of view,
that at least one group of labourers suffers from a unification of the two professional
labour unions and from the formation of an encompassing union. In order to see this,
we compare the respective wage shares with each other. In particular, comparing
ωˆH with ω
∗
H shows that bargaining with separate labour unions is beneficial for the
labourers of type H if, and only if,
ωˆH > ω
∗
H ⇔ ηˆH > η
∗
H ⇔ µ <
µH(1− µL)
1− µHµL
(1 +R∗) . (19)
Correspondingly, we obtain for the wage share of the labourers of type L:
ωˆL > ω
∗
L ⇔ ηˆL > η
∗
L ⇔ µ <
µL(1− µH)
1− µHµL
1 +R∗
R∗
. (20)
Conditions (19) and (20) provide the crucial conditions indicating under which qual-
ifications a particular group of labourers is better off under separate negotiations.
It is expedient to commence the analysis with an investigation of the profit shares
under both scenarios. From eqs (9) and (18) we know
ωˆK =
(1− µH)(1− µL)
1− µHµL
ωˆcK and ω
∗
K = (1− µ)ω
∗c
K ,
respectively. Comparing ωˆK and ω
∗
K we find:
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Proposition 2. The profit share under separate bargains (weakly) falls short of the
profit share under joint bargains:
ωˆK ≤ ω
∗
K ,
and both inequalities hold strictly if either min{µH , µL} > 0 or max{µH , µL} > µ (or
both).
Proof: From Corollary 1 we know that ωˆcK = ω
∗c
K , so that
ωˆK ≤ ω
∗
K ⇔ 1− µ ≥
(1− µH)(1− µL)
1− µHµL
=: φ(µH, µL).
Assume w. l. o. g. that µH ≥ µL and thus µH ≥ µ ≥ µL. Since φ is decreasing in
both of its arguments, the function φ(µH , ·) is maximal (on [0, µH]) for µL = 0 with
φ(µH , 0) = 1−µH ≤ 1−µ. Consequently, the condition 1−µ ≥ φ(µH , µL) is fulfilled
and ωˆK ≤ ω
∗
K thus holds for any pair (µH , µL) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1], with µL ≤ µH . Finally,
φ(µH , µL) < 1−µ for all (µH , µL) ∈ (0, 1]×(0, 1], and since φ(µH , 0) = 1−µH = 1−µ
if, and only if, µH = µ (including the case µH = 0 = µ), the equality φ(µH, µL) = 1−µ
holds if, and only if, µL = 0 and µH = µ. 
According to Proposition 2 the profit share is higher under joint bargains than
under separate bargains. Since we know from Proposition 1 that output is the same
under both regimes, a higher profit share immediately translates into a higher profit
level. We can thus conclude that the firm is worse off under separate bargains when
compared with joint bargains.
Since the sum of the wages shares of both groups of labourers is one minus the
profit share, it immediately follows that
ωˆK ≤ ω
∗
K ⇔ 1− ωˆK ≥ 1− ω
∗
K ⇔ ωˆH + ωˆL ≥ ω
∗
H + ω
∗
L .
Since the sum of both wage shares is (weakly) lower under joint bargains, we conclude:
Proposition 3. For at least one group of labourers the wage share under joint bargains
(weakly) falls short the wage share under separate bargains:
ωˆH ≥ ω
∗
H or ωˆL ≥ ω
∗
L,
(or both). Both inequalities hold strictly if either min{µH, µL} > 0 or max{µH , µL} >
µ (or both).
Finally, it remains to show that it may in fact happen that both groups of labour-
ers are worse off under joint bargains. In order to see this, it suffices to provide a
simple example. Assume that µH = µL = µ. Then we have ηˆH = ηˆL = µ/(1 + µ) so
that
ωˆH > ω
∗
H ⇔ ηˆH > η
∗
H ⇔
µ
1 + µ
>
µ
1 +R∗
⇔ µ < R∗, (21)
ωˆL > ω
∗
L ⇔ ηˆL > η
∗
L ⇔
µ
1 + µ
>
µ
1 +R∗−1
⇔ µ <
1
R∗
. (22)
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Thus, a lower wage share materializes for both groups of labourers if µ is sufficiently
low (or equivalently, if R∗ is sufficiently close to unity).
Corollary 2. Let µH = µL. Both groups of labourers are worse off under joint
negotiations if, and only if, µ < min{R∗, 1/R∗}.
Loosely speaking, the condition µ < min{R∗, 1/R∗} is fulfilled if the bargaining out-
come reflects a sufficient degree of symmetry, in the sense that the ratio of excess
wage incomes R∗ = (L∗(w∗L − u¯L)/(H
∗(w∗H − u¯H) does not differ substantially from
unity. In other words, as long as the excess utilities under joint bargaining are not
“too different”, a split of the joint union into two separate ones is beneficial for both
labourer groups. — Thus, as this example, which merely presumes similar bargain-
ing strength, shows, the outcome that both groups of labourers are worse off under
joint negotiations is by no means pathological, it rather seems to be the rule than an
exception.
Finally, we wish to emphasize that as the number of employed labourers is con-
stant over both regimes (see Proposition 1), all of our results directly translate into
corresponding statements regarding wage rates. Because each union member retains
his/her employment status, a higher wage share must directly translate into a higher
wage rate, so that employed union members are strictly better off (as they receive
higher wages without losing their job), and unemployed members are unaffected (as
their number stays constant). Thus, we immediately infer from Proposition 3 that a
corresponding result must also hold for the wage rates.
Corollary 3. For at least one group of labourers the wage rate under joint bargains
(weakly) falls short the wage rate under separate bargains:
wˆH ≥ w
∗
H or wˆL ≥ w
∗
L,
(or both). Both inequalities hold strictly if either min{µH, µL} > 0 or max{µH , µL} >
µ (or both).
It is thus beneficial for at least one group of labourers to abandon the joint labour
union (if it does already exist) and to constitute a craft-specific labour union. Or re-
versely, at least one group of labourers suffers from a unification of the two professional
labour unions and the formation of an encompassing union. This result holds for each
group on the whole (Proposition 3) as well as for each of its members (Corollary 3)
— and it may even hold for both types of labourers as Corollary 2 shows.
7. Corner Solutions
Finally we shall argue in this section that, in the case of joint bargains, corner solutions
may well result. If this happens to occur, either of both groups is paid at its reservation
wage, while the other receives a wage rate above its reservation level. To start with,
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we substitute for η∗H , η
∗
L and R
∗ in eqs (14) and (15), so that the Nash curves under
joint bargains may be written as(
w∗H − f
∗
H
)(
(1− µ)pic − pi∗
)
= 0 =
(
w∗L − f
∗
L
)(
(1− µ)pic − pi∗
)
.
It follows that both conditions are fulfilled if w∗H and w
∗
L are set so as to guarantee
pi∗ = (1− µ)pic ⇔ w∗LL
∗ + w∗HH
∗ = Y ∗ − (1− µ)pic (23)
⇔ L∗(w∗L − w¯L) +H
∗(w∗H − w¯H) = µpi
c .
Accordingly, under joint negotiations, the payoff of the united labour union equals a
share equal to its bargaining power µ of the competitive profit, pic. The joint labour
union thus acquires a share of the pure economic profit, which is the higher the greater
is its bargaining power. Moreover, we now become aware that in the solution there
is one degree of freedom, as any pair (w∗H , w
∗
L) satisfying condition (23) is a solution
of the bargaining problem. Let henceforth the set of these pairs be denoted by S∗.
Since the right hand side of eq. (23) is constant, as (H∗, L∗) is fixed at (Hc, Lc), the
set S∗ can conveniently be defined by S∗ := {(w∗H, w
∗
L)|w
∗
LL
c +w∗HH
c = C}, with the
constant C given by C := Y c − (1− µ)Πc.
In the preceding sections we scrutinized an interior solution (compare conditions
(23) and (18)) assuming that both wages are set above the respective reservation
wages. However, we now realise that w∗H and w
∗
L are not uniquely determined and
that, beyond this, corner solutions may also come about in equilibrium: In this case,
one group of labourers receives its reservation wage, while the other group receives
a correspondingly higher wage rate. Clearly, since the bargaining solution is unique
in terms of the parties’ utility, all equilibrium quadruples (w∗H , w
∗
L, H
∗, L∗) must yield
the same utility pair (ψ∗, pi∗) := (Ψ(w∗H, w
∗
L, H
∗, L∗),Π(w∗H , w
∗
L, H
∗, L∗)), so that with
employment fixed at (H∗, L∗) = (Hc, Lc), both parties are indifferent between any
pair (w∗H , w
∗
L) satisfying eq. (23). This implies that both parties’ indifference curves,
representing the utility levels (ψ∗, pi∗) must coincide in the (wH , wL)–space for all pairs
(w∗H , w
∗
L) ∈ S
∗. In fact, differentiating equation (23) with respect to both wage rates,
we obtain
dw∗H
dw∗L
= −
L∗
H∗
,
which equals the slope of the indifference curves of both the labour union and the
firms in the (wH , wL)–space.
34 Consequently, both parties’ indifference curves are
straight lines with slope −L∗/H∗, for all (w∗H , w
∗
L) ∈ S
∗. Employers and the joint
labour union are both interested only in the sum of total wage payment, though with
opposing signs, such that the distribution of labour cost among the two groups does
not matter.
34This is a direct consequence of ∂Ψ/∂wH = −∂Π/∂wH = H and ∂Ψ/∂wL = −∂Π/∂wL = L.
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We subsequently scrutinize the implications of these corner solutions. To this
end, let us suppose for expository purpose that w∗H = w¯H = f
∗
H . Since the utility of
type-H labourers is reduced to their reservation wage, type-L labourers and the firm
divide the available profit pic = Y c− f cHH
c− f cLL
c = Y ∗− f ∗HH
∗− f ∗LL
∗ among them
according to the rule
w∗L = µ
Y ∗ − f ∗HH
∗
L∗
+ (1− µ)f ∗L , (24)
or equivalently (w∗L − f
∗
L)L
∗ = µpic. Comparing eq. (24) with eq. (15), we deduce
that both conditions can only hold if µ = η∗L = µ/(1 + R
∗−1). It thus follows that
R∗ = +∞, reflecting the fact that w∗H = w¯H — which is what we presumed initially.
Similarly, if we presume w∗L = w¯L, the H-type labourers and the firm divide the
competitive profit among them, implying that R∗ equals zero. Hence, combining
interior and corner solutions we conclude that all wage agreements in S∗ cover values
of R∗ ranging over R+, while leaving the utilities of both bargaining parties unaffected.
It is clear that the group of labourers whose members merely receive their reser-
vation wage is worse off, when compared with separate bargains, for the wage falls
while employment is fixed. One might therefore expect that the second group of
labourers must benefit from joint bargains if they accomplish to hold the wage of
the other group at its reservation wage. However, we now show that this presump-
tion is not necessarily true. Accordingly, we now explore whether, and if so, under
which conditions one group of labourers may benefit from a corner solution under
joint bargains, when compared with the outcome under separate bargains. To this
end, presume w. l. o. g. that µH ≥ µL and thus µ ∈ [µL, µH]. (Recall that µ is a
short hand notation for some function weakly increasing µ : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ [0, 1] with
µ(µH , µL) ∈ [min{µH, µL},max{µH , µL}], ∀µH , µL ∈ [0, 1].)
Let us first consider the situation of L-type labourers assuming that the utility
of H-type labourers is boiled down to their reservation utility, i. e., w∗H = w¯H = f
∗
H .
For the labourers of group L to be better off under w∗H = w¯H = f
∗
H , than under under
separate bargains, it must be true that
w∗L > wˆL ⇔ µ > ηˆL(µH , µL) :=
µL(1− µH)
1− µHµL
.
As this condition is fulfilled for any pair for µH ≥ µL, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4. Let w∗H = w¯H . Then w
∗
L ≥ wˆL for all (µH , µL) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] with
µH ≥ µL; and w
∗
L > wˆL whenever either µ > µL or µL > 0 (or both).
Proof: Since ηˆL is decreasing in the first and increasing in its second argument, the
function ηˆL(·, µL) is maximal (on [µL, 1]) for µH = µL, with ηˆL(µL, µL) = µL/(1 +
µL). Thus µ > µL and µL > 0 are both sufficient conditions for µ > ηˆL(µH , µL).
As a consequence, the weaker group of labourers is always better off under joint
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negotiations (compared to separate negotiations), if the wage of the stronger group is
fixed at its reservation wage. 
Let us next consider the situation of type-H labourers, assuming now that w∗L =
w¯L = f
∗
L. For the labourers of group H to be better off in this corner solution than
under separate bargains, it must be true that
w∗H > wˆH ⇔ µ > ηˆH(µH, µL) :=
µH(1− µL)
1− µHµL
.
This condition may or may not be fulfilled. In fact, it is fulfilled if µH is close to µL;
but otherwise, not. In order to state this result more precisely, let, for any given value
µH ∈ [0, 1], µL = κ(µH) be the solution of µ(µH , µL) =
µH (1−µL)
1−µHµL
. Then we have:
Proposition 5. Let w∗L = w¯L. Then w
∗
H ≥ wˆH for all µL ∈ [κ(µH), µH ] and w
∗
L < wˆL
for all µL ∈ [0, κ(µH)).
Proof: Since ηˆH is decreasing in its second argument, the function ηˆH(µH , ·) is max-
imal (on [0, µH) for µL = 0, and minimal for µL = µH , with ηˆH(µH , 0) = µH and
ηˆH(µH, µH) = µH/(1 + µH). The function µ : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → [0, 1], however, is in-
creasing in both arguments with µ(x, x) = x, ∀x ∈ [0, 1], so that the function µ(µH, ·)
is increasing with µ(µH , 0) ≤ µH and µ(µH , µH) = µH . Putting pieces together, since
ηˆH(µH, 0) = µH ≥ µ(µH , 0) and ηˆH(µH, µH) = µH/(1 + µH) ≤ µH = µ(µH , µH), it
follows that for any µH ∈ (0, 1] (which are the only cases of interest), both functions,
ηˆH(µH, ·) and µ(µH , ·), must intersect exactly once for some µL ∈ (0, µH), due to
monotonicity of µ(µH , ·) and strict monotonicity of ηˆH(µH , ·). 
Proposition 5 states that µ > ηˆH(µH , µL) can never be fulfilled for some µL
sufficiently close to zero; but this condition does hold for some µH sufficiently close
to µH . In other words, if the bargaining power of the stronger group sufficiently
dominates the power of the weaker group, there is no incentive to constitute a joint
labour union, even if under a joint labour union the weak group were to receive its
reservation wage. Only if the difference µH − µL becomes sufficiently small, is it
beneficial for the stronger group to end up in the “favourable” corner solution under
a joint labour union.
Two effects determine whether a corner solution under bargains with a joint
labour union or (an interior solution under) bargains with a separate labour union
yields a higher wage rate (and thus a higher wage share). Both of these effects can
formally be seen by inspecting the respective Nash products, so compare the Nash
product of the labour union of group i,
max
wi
[
Lci
(
wi − w¯i
)]µi[Y c − wiLci − w−iLc−i]1−µi ,
with the Nash product of the joint labour union, when w−i is fixed at w¯−i,
max
wi
[
Lci
(
wi − w¯i
)]µ[
Y c − wiL
c
i − w¯−iL
c
−i
]1−µ
.
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Then, the first effect originates from the consequences of the union unification by
bringing about a modified parameter of bargaining power, so that µi is replaced by µ.
This effect is clearly beneficial for the weak, but detrimental for the strong group of
workers, as µ is some weighted average of the pre-unification parameters of bargaining
power. The second effect results from an increase in the size of the cake about which
the joint labour union and the employers’ federation negotiate, once the wage of the
other group is fixed at the respective reservation wage.
In Section 6 we showed that there is a strong tendency for both groups of labourers
to favour independent bargains over joint bargains (see Proposition 3). If however the
joint labour union and the employers’ federation were to agree upon a corner solution
(or some outcome sufficiently close to that), the picture may change somewhat for
one group: In a corner solution one group is left with its reservation utility, implying
that total economic profit is divided by the other group and the firm. While the
firm and the united labour union are indifferent between any solution in S∗, a corner
solution is beneficial for one group of labourers if the amount which can be reaped
from the other is sufficiently large, such that after sharing this with the firm, a larger
wage payment is achieved than under separate bargains. While this revenue effect is
always sufficiently strong for the weaker of both groups of labourers, it cannot come
about, though, for the stronger group when the bargaining power of the weaker group
is sufficiently close to zero. For, in this case, the strong group can appropriate only a
small amount from the weak, while it would have negotiated for a substantial share
of the economic rent in separate negotiations, anyway.
8. Conclusion
Within the last decades we observed two opposing trends in trade union formation:
On the one hand, independent labour unions merged in order to constitute encom-
passing or industry unions; on the other hand, specialized groups of employees formed
independent craft-specific labour unions, or abandoned existing tariff-unions. Due to
the overwhelming economic importance of labour markets and labour market con-
tracts, it is both a politically important, economically intriguing and theoretically
challenging question whether labour unions (should) amalgamate or stand alone. In
this paper we tackle this question and ask whether it is in the interest of two different
groups of employees to maintain their own independent professional labour unions, or
to form a joint (or encompassing) union; and if so, under which conditions.
Applying the (asymmetric) Nash bargaining solution to firm-union negotiations,
we commence our analysis with an inspection of the Pareto and the (so-called) Nash
curves with and without a merger. Compared with the situation under separate
negotiations a merger does not affect the shape of the Pareto curves, but significantly
affects the Nash curves: For a united trade union the original parameters of bargaining
power of the two independent unions are replaced by a new parameter which we
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call “notional bargaining power”. The parameters account for the effects a labour
contract for one group imposes on the other: Firstly, there is the effect that an
amalgamation of the two labour unions results in a new trade union whose bargaining
power is arguably some combination of those of its constituents. Secondly, the joint
labour union acknowledges that a more favourable contract on behalf of one group of
labourers raises the firm’s cost and thus reduces the scope for a propitious contract
on behalf of the other group, an effect which is disregarded by independent unions.
Both effects make the joint union to demand more moderate contracts such that the
total wage bill is lower and profit is higher under negotiations with a joint union when
compared with two independent unions.
As shown, the wage bill may be split arbitrarily between the two groups, for any
substitution in wage rates which leaves profit unaffected also accomplishes the task to
keep the encompassing unions utility constant. That is, a joint union may trade the
utility of one group for benefit of the other without affecting profits. For that reason
there is a continuum of equilibrium labour market contracts the firm and the joint
union may negotiate for. Yet, whatever solution they choose, at least one group of
labourers is worse off when compared with the bargaining outcome with independent
labour unions — and under a sufficient degree of symmetry, even both will be worse
off. This shows that a single group may not be wrong in suspecting that its interest
may effectively be disregarded by a large encompassing union.
Equipped with these findings, we then explore the stability of a joint labour
union. Assuming that transfer payments between different types of workers are not
possible, an encompassing union must be regarded as unstable (if it presently exists)
or as unlikely to be established (if it does not yet exist). Because at least one group of
labourers is better of with an independent craft-specific union, this instability result
holds true irrespective of whether we view the choice of the union structure as a
non-cooperative game or as a co-operative game with non-transferable utility.
Our results are thus consistent with two central conclusions of Horn and Wolin-
sky (1988), p. 485 (and others): When the two types of labour are sufficiently strong
complements, then in equilibrium the two types are likely to be organized in two sep-
arate unions ; and when there are two independent unions their behaviour is more
aggressive. The latter result explains why the “effective” bargaining power of each
group tends to be lower after the merger when compared with the pre-merger level.
However, our analysis does not only confirm their results, but also substantially ex-
tends them, as we employ a different equilibrium concept (efficient Nash bargains)
and, more importantly, allow for some arbitrary well-behaved production function
and allow for an endogenous determination of the wage rates and the employment
levels of both groups of labourers.
Finally, from the firm’s point of view the result is clear-cut. The profit is higher
under joint negotiations than under separate negotiations with two unions. Firms
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thus favour bargaining with a joint labour union, over bargaining with independent
craft-specific labour unions. To cite Horn and Wolinsky (1988), p. 493, again: . . .
when the two types of labour are organized separately each union can force the firm
to bargain over the division of the entire surplus. In this sense the firm’s surplus is
bargained for twice — by each union in turn. Thus, while a firm may disapprove to
negotiate with a labour union acting on behalf of all workers’ interest, bargaining with
two independent labour unions is even worse.
In view of the instability result of an encompassing labour union, this paper
contributes to explaining the recently observed trend towards the formation small
independent craft-specific unions. Clearly, our model abstracts from some important
aspects such as an endogenization of the bargaining power, the self-interest of union
leaders or heterogeneous preferences of workers. In particular, a consideration of non-
competitive behaviour on the output market and thus an analysis of the degree of
competition on the output market on labour market negotiations may shed additional
light onto the incentives for union mergers. An incorporation of these features may
or may not confine this result, and, as a result, may also lead to a modification of the
implied optimal policy rule for employees which recommends split-ups rather than
amalgamations of labour unions. Such extensions of the present model must be left
for future research, though.
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